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The ubiquitous and intense nature of stress responses necessitate that we understand how they affect
decision-making. Despite a number of studies examining risky decision-making under stress, it is as yet
unclear whether and in what way stress alters the underlying processes that shape our choices. This is in
part because previous studies have not separated and quantiﬁed dissociable valuation and decision-
making processes that can affect choices of risky options, including risk attitudes, loss aversion, and
choice consistency, among others. Here, in a large, fully-crossed two-day within-subjects design, we
examined how acute stress alters risky decision-making. On each day, 120 participants completed either
the cold pressor test or a control manipulation with equal probability, followed by a risky decision-
making task. Stress responses were assessed with salivary cortisol. We ﬁt an econometric model to
choices that dissociated risk attitudes, loss aversion, and choice consistency using hierarchical Bayesian
techniques to both pool data and allow heterogeneity in decision-making. Acute stress was found to have
no effect on risk attitudes, loss aversion, or choice consistency, though participants did become more loss
averse and more consistent on the second day relative to the ﬁrst. In the context of an inconsistent
previous literature on risk and acute stress, our ﬁndings provide strong and speciﬁc evidence that acute
stress does not affect risk attitudes, loss aversion, or consistency in risky monetary decision-making.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Because risky decisions are both ubiquitous and must often be
made under stress, it is imperative to understand the interactions
between stress and choices under risk. However, despite a number
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r Inc. This is an open access articlemaking (see Table S1), it is as yet unclear whether and how they
interact. In the gain domain, several studies ﬁnd evidence for more
gambling1 under acute stress (i.e. riskier choices; less risk aversion;
more utility function convexity) (Preston et al., 2007; Starcke et al.,
2008; Putman et al., 2010; Pabst et al., 2013b, 2013c), while others
ﬁnd less gambling under stress (i.e. safer choices; more risk aver-
sion; more utility function concavity) (Porcelli and Delgado, 2009;
Cingl and Cahlikova, 2013), no changes in gambling (von Dawans
et al., 2012; Delaney et al., 2014; Kandasamy et al., 2014), or both
more and less gambling depending on factors like gender (Lighthall
et al., 2009; van den Bos et al., 2009), time (Pabst et al., 2013a), trait
anxiety and depressive symptoms (Robinson et al., 2015), or
outcome magnitude (von Helversen and Rieskamp, 2013). Even
with respect to gender, the ﬁndings are equivocal: roughly equal
numbers of studies found interactions with gender (Preston et al.,
2007; Lighthall et al., 2009; van den Bos et al., 2009) as did not
(Starcke et al., 2008; Pabst et al., 2013b; von Helversen and
Rieskamp, 2013; Kandasamy et al., 2014).
One reason for this apparent inconsistency may be that, with
one exception (Kandasamy et al., 2014; see Table S1), all the studies
mentioned above used the same problematic measure of riskyunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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measure is inadequate because choices between more and less
risky options reﬂect the combined contributions of multiple
different processes. For example, someone under stress might
gamble less (that is, their probability of gambling might go down)
because they dislike the element of chance or risk in the gamble
(termed risk attitudes), because they overweight the risky loss
relative to the risky gain (termed loss aversion), or simply because
they are choosing more (or less) consistently than before despite
having the same risk attitudes and loss aversion. Depending on the
kinds of choices, other factors can also inﬂuence the probability of
gambling, including probability weighting (the subjective, as
opposed to objective, probability of an event occurring), ambiguity
aversion (the distaste for unknown probabilities in decision op-
tions), or even dynamic updating when learning in complex,
changing, or experiential settings.
Concluding that changes in the probability of gambling are due
to changes in attitudes toward risk without dissociating other
relevant processes would be analogous to concluding that stress
affects memory recall after a study in which participants memo-
rized items and performed a recognition test all while under stress.
Such a conclusion would be obviously ﬂawed as differences in
recognition could reﬂect changes in perception, encoding, consol-
idation, familiarity, or recall e and without careful design and
analysis, would all be thoroughly confounded. By the same token,
the fundamentally different processes underlying risky choices
must be simultaneously and separately quantiﬁed, or otherwise
accounted for, in order to understand the ways in which acute
stress does and does not affect decisions under risk.
In this study, we sought to dissociate and quantify three sepa-
rable decision-making processes under acute stress in a fully-
crossed within-subjects design. Brieﬂy, participants came in on
each of two days, identical except for experiencing an acute stress
or control manipulation with equal probability on each day. Indi-
vidual differences in HPA axis activity were objectively quantiﬁed
with four measurements of salivary cortisol per day (Velasco et al.,
1997; McRae et al., 2006). Participants' decision-making was also
quantiﬁed with a risky decision-making task (Sokol-Hessner et al.
2009, 2013, 2015a, 2015b) that, in combination with an econo-
metric model of valuation and decision-making, allowed the sep-
aration of risk attitudes, loss aversion, and consistency in decision-
making for each participant on each day. Finally, statistically
powerful hierarchical Bayesian analysis methods were used to pool
the data from 120 participants, both leveraging individual differ-
ences and group-level analysis to identify how acute stress affects
or spares the three measured processes contributing to risky de-
cision-making.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
A total of 122 participants completed the task. Two participants
were subsequently dropped when it became apparent that they did
not understand the mechanics of the task, leaving a total of 120
participants (64 female; mean age ¼ 22.4, standard
deviation ¼ 4.5). Our fully crossed design (Stress or Control con-
dition on each of Day 1 and Day 2) resulted in four groups (Stress-
Stress, Stress-Control, Control-Stress, or Control-Control). Partici-
pants were evenly distributed (N ¼ 30) across these four groups.
One participant was excluded from cortisol analyses as their mean
salivary cortisol level was more than thirty standard deviations
above the group mean.
All participants provided informed consent in accordance with
procedures approved by NYU's University Committee on ActivitiesInvolving Human Subjects.
2.2. Study design
2.2.1. Overall study design
All participants came in for two nearly identical sessions,
separated by a mean of 5.3 days (standard deviation ¼ 2.7; see
Fig. 1; delay between sessions did not differ as a function of Group:
F(3,119)¼ 1.48, p¼ 0.22). All sessions began between 11:30a.m. and
5:20p.m. (Day 1mean¼ 2:17p.m., standard deviation¼ 1.6 h; Day 2
mean ¼ 2:12p.m., standard deviation ¼ 1.5 h). Following consent,
participants were immediately endowed with $30 and told they
would be paid the outcome of a subset of the trials in the decision-
making task. The experimenter then read the task instructions out
loud as the participant silently read along, after which participants
completed a brief comprehension quiz on task details, and
completed practice trials under experimenter supervision.
The ﬁrst of four saliva samples was then taken (see below), after
which participants underwent either the cold pressor test (CPT; a
common acute stress induction procedure; Velasco et al., 1997;
McRae et al., 2006) or a lukewarm water control. In the CPT, par-
ticipants submerge their non-dominant arm up to and including
their elbow in 0e4 C water for three minutes. The participant is
asked to not speak during the CPT, and the time elapsed is not
shared with the participant. The lukewarm water control used
30e32 C water. Participants had an equal chance of undergoing
the CPT or control condition on each of the two days. Immediately
following the conclusion of the CPT (or control), a second saliva
sample was collected, and then participants were given an 8-min
break during which they were asked to sit quietly without using
any digital devices. They then gave a third saliva sample, after
which they completed the risky decision-making task which took
roughly 23 min (see below; Sokol-Hessner et al. 2009, 2013, 2015a,
2015b). Finally, participants gave a fourth saliva sample and
completed a post-study questionnaire.
Participants were paid $15 per hour, plus their adjusted $30
endowment at the end of each day. Fifteen trials were selected at
random from the task and their outcomes summed with the
endowment to produce the adjusted endowment. The mean
adjusted endowment at the end of Day 1 was $53.08 (standard
deviation ¼ $22.08), and Day 2 was $51.80 (standard
deviation ¼ $18.19). The difference in payment between days was
not signiﬁcant (paired samples t-test, p ¼ 0.62).
2.2.2. Risky decision-making task
The main task of interest was a risky monetary decision-making
task. As the task we used has been described in detail elsewhere
(Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009, 2013), we will brieﬂy summarize it
here. Participants made 150 decisions between risky binary gam-
bles and guaranteed alternatives. For 120 of the trials, termed
“gain-loss trials”, the risky gamble consisted of equal chances of
winning some amount or losing a different amount (amounts var-
ied trial-to-trial), versus a guaranteed alternative of zero dollars. In
the remaining thirty “gain-only trials”, the risky gamble yielded a
positive amount or zero dollars with equal probability, and the
guaranteed alternative was a smaller positive amount. The values
used on each trial were unique (i.e. no trials were repeated). Trial
order was random. The 50/50 probabilities used throughout the
task effectively eliminated possible roles for ambiguity and prob-
ability weighting in the task, as all probabilities were explicitly
known, and probabilities did not vary.
On each trial, the choice options were initially presented for 2s.
After two seconds had passed, a response prompt (“?”) appeared
prompting participants to enter their choice within two seconds.
This was followed by an inter-stimulus interval (1s), the display of
Fig. 1. Study procedure. Participants came into the lab for two sessions, a minimum of 2 days apart at roughly the same time of day (see Methods). The ﬁrst day began with
monetary endowment, task instructions, and a basic comprehension quiz before the ﬁrst (baseline) cortisol sample was taken (represented in the ﬁgure by a schematic salivary
collection tube). After either undergoing the cold pressor test (CPT) or the lukewarm water control, participants gave a second salivary sample, waited 10 min for salivary cortisol
levels to rise, and gave a third (pre-task) salivary sample. Participants then completed the risky decision-making task allowing estimation of risk attitudes (r, in green), loss aversion
(l, in red), and choice consistency (m, in blue), after which they gave the fourth and ﬁnal salivary sample, and completed a few basic debrieﬁng questionnaires assessing their
experience. The second day was identical to the ﬁrst, except participants had an equal and independent chance of performing the CPT or lukewarm water control on each day. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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alternative depending on the participant's choice; 1s), and an inter-
trial interval (1, 2, or 3s, uniformly distributed) before the next trial
began.
The task had no temporal component to eliminate temporal
discounting, included only two simple probabilities (0.5 and 1) to
minimize the effect of any probability weighting, and was thor-
oughly instructed in detail and practiced to minimize learning and
eliminate ambiguity.2.2.3. Cortisol measurement
Salivary samples were collected four times each day for each
participant (see Fig. 1). For each sample, participants held a sterile
synthetic polymer-based oral salivette under their tongue for two
minutes, after which the swab was placed in a sterile collection
tube and frozen at 20 C. Frozen salivary samples were analyzed
by Salimetrics Testing Services (a Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments-certiﬁed lab; Carlsbad, CA) using high-sensitivity
enzyme immunoassay kits to assay cortisol levels.2.3. Analysis
2.3.1. Cortisol analysis
An initial visual inspection of raw cortisol values identiﬁed one
participant (mentioned in Section 2.1, Participants) with a mean
salivary cortisol level more than thirty standard deviations above
the group mean. This participant was removed from any subse-
quent cortisol analyses.
To conﬁrm the efﬁcacy of the CPT, we ﬁrst analyzed the change
in cortisol measurement from the baseline cortisol sample taken
immediately before the CPT to the three later time points (imme-
diately after the CPT, prior to the decision-making task, and
immediately after the task). The Stress condition resulted in
signiﬁcantly larger increases in cortisol relative to the Control
condition across both the pre- and post-task time points (see
Supplemental Materials for tests within each group, across days
and timepoints). To quantify individual differences in cortisol
reactivity for use as a covariate in behavioral analyses, we focused
on the change in cortisol between the baseline (1) and pre-task (3)
time points. Because raw cortisol change values were positively
skewed, but spanned zero, we used a modiﬁed log procedure
similar to that used elsewhere (e.g. Otto et al., 2013) to reduce
skewness while maintaining the meaningfulness of zero values
(DCortisol ¼ log([Cortisol3-Cortisol1]þ0.5)-log(0.5)).2.3.2. Behavioral analysis
Behavioral analysis proceeded in two main portions, the ﬁrst of
which consisted of examining changes in the simple probability of
choosing the risky gamble across days as a function of condition
(Stress vs. Control), replicating the analysis approach used in many
other studies of risky decision-making under stress (see Table S1).
For the second main analysis, we ﬁt prospect theory-inspired
models of the non-linear processes underlying valuation and
choice using a hierarchical Bayesian approach. The basic model was
identical to that used previously (see Equations (1)e(3); Sokol-
Hessner et al. 2009, 2013, 2015a, 2015b).
u

xþ

¼ pðxÞ  xr (1)
u

x

¼ pðxÞ  l ðxÞr (2)
pðchoose gambleÞ ¼

1þ emðuðgambleÞuðguaranteedÞÞ
1
(3)
Equations (1) and (2) determine the utility (u(x)) of the objective
monetary amounts in the risky gamble and the guaranteed alter-
native. The difference in utility between the gamble and the guar-
anteed alternative is then used to calculate the probability of
choosing the gamble as given by the standard softmax function in
Equation (3). The model ﬁts three parameters describing three
distinct aspects of participants' decision-making. The parameter r
(rho), captures risk attitudes or the diminishing marginal utility of
money (represented by the curvature of the utility function), and is
constrained to be the same across the gain and loss domains. When
r ¼ 1, participants are risk neutral; less than 1 indicates risk aver-
sion for gains and risk seeking for losses, and greater than 1 in-
dicates risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses. The
parameter l (lambda) quantiﬁes loss aversion deﬁned as the rela-
tive multiplicative weighting of losses to gains in choices. A l of 1
indicates gain-loss neutrality (i.e. similar weight), while values
greater than 1 indicate loss aversion, and less than 1 indicate gain-
seeking. Finally, m (mu) quantiﬁes participants' internal consistency
in choices. Higher values of m represent greater consistency across
decisions, versus lower values which indicate noisiness in decision-
making. Critically, the inclusion of a number of both gain-loss and
gain-only trial types in the task (see Section 2.2.2 Risky Decision-
Making Task) allowed the separation of these three free
parameters.
The hierarchical Bayesian approach to ﬁtting this model gave us
a statistical advantage by explicitly modeling and ﬁtting
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attitude) as well as at the level of the group (e.g. the mean popu-
lation risk attitude). Using such a model, and therefore ﬁtting all
participants' data simultaneously, has the effect of reducing the
inﬂuence of outliers or noise, and thus maximizing ‘signal’. It also
has the beneﬁt of allowing us to directly model the effect of interest
e that is, the effect of acute stress on each of the three valuation and
decision processes at both the population and individual partici-
pant levels.
Formally, we ﬁt two main models: Model 1 took a “condition”
approach (i.e. Stress/Control as a binary variable), while Model 2
took a “covariate” approach (i.e. the continuous effect of DCortisol).
qi;j ¼ eqiþStressjDqSiþDayjDqDi (4)
qi  NormalðqM; qV Þ (5)
DqSi  NormalðDqSM;DqSV Þ (6)
DqDi  NormalðDqDM;DqDV Þ (7)
Equation (4) describes how each parameter (r, l, and m; any one of
which is represented here by q) was modeled for participant i on
day j. qi is participant i's baseline parameter value, Stressj is a binary
indicator for whether day j occurred in the Stress (1) or Control (0)
condition, DqSi is the parameter capturing the change in parameter
q due to Stress (“S”) for participant i, Dayj is a binary indicator for
whether day j is Day 1 (0) or Day 2 (1), andDqDi captures the change
in parameter q due to Day (“D”; e.g. repeated performance) for
participant i. The three components (individual baseline parameter
value; effect of Stress; effect of Day) were summed within an
exponential to prevent ﬁnal parameter values (qi,j) from being non-
positive (zero is the lower bound for each of r, l, and m). Equations
(5)e(7) illustrate how individual level parameters (e.g. qi) were
Gaussian-distributed around population means (e.g. qM) and stan-
dard deviations (e.g. qV).
Although Equation (4) is written for the “condition” approach
(Model 1), the “covariate” approach (Model 2) is identical, with the
exception of the Stressj binary indicator being replaced by DCorti-
soli,j, representing the change in cortisol for participant i on day j
(see Section 2.3.1 Cortisol Analysis).
These models were ﬁt to the data using standard Markov-Chain
Monte Carlo sampling methods in rStan (v2.2.0; Stan Development
Team, 2015) as implemented in R (v3.0.2; R Core Team, 2015). For
each of Model 1 and Model 2, 3000 samples were collected after aFig. 2. Change in cortisol at the third (pre-task) time point. Bars reﬂect the mean change in
indicate the stress condition, and purple bars the control condition, while solid bars indic
N ¼ 30), and P values reﬂect paired t-tests between the change in cortisol values across day
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)burn-in of 3000 samples (to allow chains to reach steady sampling
states) on each of four chains, for a ﬁnal total of 12,000 samples
collected for each parameter (representing the posterior distribu-
tion over that parameter's possible values). For parameters of in-
terest, 95% conﬁdence intervals (CIs) were calculated using the
samples, and examined to see if they contained zero (if they did not,
we could be 95% conﬁdent that the true value of the relevant
parameter was not zero). To calculate the magnitude of the effects
of Stress (or DCortisol) and Day on the value function, parameter
values were reconstructed with Equation (4), using mean sample
values for the relevant parameters.3. Results
3.1. Cortisol
Generally speaking, cortisol levels gradually decreased in the
Control condition across the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th timepoints relative
to the 1st (consistent with our afternoon testing time), and signif-
icantly increased in the Stress condition at the 3rd and 4th time-
points (pre- and post-risky decision-making task). For detailed
comparisons as a function of timepoint, group, day, and condition,
see Supplementary Materials and Fig. S1.
Focusing on the change in cortisol at the 3rd timepoint (Fig. 2),
we found large and signiﬁcant differences between Day 1 and Day 2
using paired t-tests for the Control-Stress group (Day 1 ¼ 0.01 mg/
ml; Day 2 ¼ 0.16 mg/ml; t(29) ¼ 5.3, p ¼ 0.00001), and the Stress-
Control group (Day 1 ¼ 0.10 mg/ml; Day 2 ¼ 0.01 mg/ml;
t(29) ¼ 3.2, p ¼ 0.003), and a small but signiﬁcant difference in the
Control-Control group (Day 1 ¼ 0.05 mg/ml; Day 2 ¼ 0.01 mg/ml;
t(29) ¼ 2.5 p ¼ 0.02). The Stress-Stress group was not signiﬁcantly
different across days (Day 1 ¼ 0.17 mg/ml; Day 2 ¼ 0.11 mg/ml;
t(28) ¼ 1.7, p ¼ 0.1). The modiﬁed log transformation used on these
values to create the DCortisol variable used in covariate analyses
(see below, Section 3.2.2) did not change the pattern of ﬁndings, as
expected (paired t-tests on Day 1 vs. Day 2: Control-Control,
p ¼ 0.04; Control-Stress, p ¼ 0.000008; Stress-Control,
p ¼ 0.002; Stress-Stress, p ¼ 0.06).
We also performed a mixed-effects linear regression in R across
all participants using the lmer package (Bates et al., 2015), pre-
dicting individuals' change in cortisol at the 3rd timepoint with a
random intercept and ﬁxed effects for Day, Stress, and a
Day  Stress interaction. We found signiﬁcant effects for the
intercept (b ¼ 0.06, p ¼ 1.8  108) and Stress (b ¼ 0.07,
p ¼ 8.9  1016), but not Day (b ¼ 0.01, p ¼ 0.35), nor the Day x
Stress interactive term (b¼0.01, p¼ 0.14), indicating that the CPTsalivary cortisol (ug/ml) from the baseline sample to the pre-task sample. Orange bars
ate day 1, and striped bars indicate day 2. Bars are paired by participant group (each
s, within group. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the
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neither simple nor interaction effects on cortisol.
3.2. Behavior
3.2.1. Simple probability of gambling
Replicating previous analysis approaches (see Table S1), we
examined the simple probability of choosing the gamble in our
task. In paired t-tests within condition groups (e.g. Control-Control)
comparing the probability of gambling across days, no group
showed a signiﬁcant change in gambling behavior (each N ¼ 30; all
p's > 0.18; see Fig. S2). Collapsing across the Stress-Control and
Control-Stress groups (N ¼ 60), paired t-tests revealed no signiﬁ-
cant difference in gambling under Stress versus Control (p ¼ 0.80).
3.2.2. Hierarchical behavioral models
3.2.2.1. Model 1: stress/control condition. Estimates of the conver-
gence of the chains on similar distributions of parameter samples
(Rhat; when Rhat¼ 1, the model has converged and chains are very
similar to each other; values above 1 suggest lack of convergence,
i.e. chains that are very different from one another) indicated that
the model ﬁt well (mean Rhat for group-level parameters ¼ 1.01).
First, we checked the baseline parameter estimates for risk at-
titudes, loss aversion, and consistency to ensure they replicated
previous work (Tom et al., 2007; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; De
Martino et al., 2010; Sokol-Hessner et al. 2013, Chumbley et al.
2014, Sokol-Hessner et al. 2015a, 2015b). Computing the mean
sample values for each of the group-level baseline parameters and
then using Equation (4) to transform those values to value function
parameter space produced appropriate values (mean recovered
r ¼ 0.92, 95%CI ¼ [0.85 0.97]; mean recovered l ¼ 2.22, 95%
CI ¼ [1.88 2.61]; and mean recovered m ¼ 25.9, 95% CI¼ [21.3 31.1]).
These indicated participants were mildly risk averse for gains (risk
seeking for losses), moderately loss averse, and somewhat consis-
tent in their choices.
Examining the 95% CIs for the parameters capturing the change
in each of r, l, and m due to Day (that is, the changes in each
parameter on Day 2 relative to Day 1) illustrated that though there
was no consistent change in risk attitudes (95% CI for DrDM¼ [-0.05
0.03]), on Day 2 people became more loss averse (95% CI for
DlDM ¼ [0.06 0.23]; mean recovered Day 2 l ¼ 2.57) and more
consistent in their choices (95% CI for DmDM ¼ [0.15 0.39]; meanFig. 3. Changes in decision-making due to Day and Stress. Group mean changes in each of r
participation (“Day”) or the cold pressor test (“Stress”). Each histogram represents 12,000
histogramwith dashed lines. Intervals excluded zero only for changes in loss aversion and con
the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)recovered Day 2 m ¼ 34.3).
In contrast to the effects of Day, when examining the 95% CIs for
the effects of the Stress condition, no consistent changes were
found for any of the decision processes modeled (95% CI for
DrSM ¼ [-0.05 0.06], mean recovered Stress r ¼ 0.92; 95% CI for
DlSM ¼ [-0.13 0.12], mean recovered Stress l ¼ 2.19; 95% CI for
DmSM¼ [-0.16 0.16], mean recovered stress m¼ 25.8). As can be seen
by a visual inspection of the 95% CIs, each is roughly centered on
zero (see Fig. 3). These conﬁdence intervals are small, as compared
to the mean sampled standard deviations (e.g. qV from Equation
(5)) for the group-level Gaussian distributions around which indi-
vidual participants' overall mean parameter values are distributed
(mean rV ¼ 0.24; mean lV ¼ 0.84; mean mV ¼ 0.87).
As the effects of stress inductions may be inconsistent inwomen
(Kirschbaum et al., 1999; McCormick and Teillon, 2001; Andreano
et al., 2008), we additionally ran Model 1 with only male partici-
pants (N ¼ 56), generally replicating the ﬁndings of Model 1 when
estimated for all participants. The mean recovered baseline pa-
rameters were comparable (mean recovered r ¼ 0.90, 95%
CI ¼ [0.83 0.97]; mean recovered l ¼ 2.47, 95% CI ¼ [1.79 3.25]; and
mean recovered m ¼ 23.4, 95% CI ¼ [16.9 32.2]). Examining the
change due to Day replicated the null effect on risk attitudes (95% CI
for DrDM¼ [-0.03 0.06]) and the positive effect on consistency (95%
CI for DmDM ¼ [0.30 0.70]), but the 95% conﬁdence interval for the
effect of Day on loss aversion no longer excluded zero (95% CI for
DlDM ¼ [-0.07 0.28]; the CI had to be relaxed to 75.7% to exclude
zero). The null effects of the Stress condition were replicated for all
three value function parameters (95% CI for DrSM ¼ [-0.08 0.05];
95% CI for DlSM ¼ [-0.22 0.24]; 95% CI for DmSM ¼ [-0.27 0.26]).
To test whether payment at the end of Day 1 altered decision-
making on Day 2, we correlated the change in endowment at the
end of Day 1 with the mean sample values of the change in r, l, and
m for each participant. Therewas no signiﬁcant correlation between
the change in endowment and changes in risk attitudes (DrDi;
r(118) ¼ 0.06, p ¼ 0.54) or consistency (DmDi; r(118) ¼ 0.06,
p ¼ 0.49), but there was a correlation with the change in loss
aversion (DlDi; r(118) ¼ 0.32, p ¼ 0.0004), such that small (or
negative) changes to the endowment on Day 1 were correlated
with more loss aversion on Day 2. The pattern and relative signif-
icance of the correlations held when using outlier-resistant non-
parametric tests (e.g. Spearman's rho).isk attitudes (r, green), loss aversion (l, red), and consistency (m, blue) due to repeated
samples from Model 1 (see Methods). 95% Conﬁdence intervals are indicated for each
sistency due to Day. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend,
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coding) maximally leverages random experimental assignment,
doing so ignores individual differences in responses to the stress
manipulations. To address this issue, we ﬁt Model 2, in which we
included a DCortisol covariate (see Section 2.3.1) instead of the
binary Stress/Control variable, to examine whether there was some
more continuous relationship between cortisol levels and changes
in risk attitudes, loss aversion, and/or consistency.
As with Model 1, Model 2 appeared to ﬁt behavior well (mean
Rhat for group-level parameters ¼ 1.02), and replicated the mean
baseline parameter estimates from Model 1 (mean recovered
r ¼ 0.92, 95%CI ¼ [0.88 0.97]; mean recovered l ¼ 2.19, 95%
CI¼ [1.87 2.57]; and mean recovered m¼ 26.0, 95% CI¼ [21.7 30.4]).
Model 2 also replicated the ﬁnding that there was no consistent
change in risk attitudes as a function of Day (95% CI for DrDM ¼ [-
0.05 0.03]), but that participants were more loss averse and
consistent on Day 2 relative to Day 1 (95% CI for DlDM¼ [0.05 0.23],
mean recovered Day 2 l¼ 2.51; 95% CI for DmDM¼ [0.18 0.40], mean
recovered Day 2 m ¼ 34.6).
Finally, we found that there was no evidence for a continuous
relationship between DCortisol and any of the value parameters
(95% CI for DrCM ¼ [-0.17 0.09]; 95% CI for DlCM ¼ [-0.21 0.35]; 95%
CI for DmCM ¼ [-0.27 0.43]; see Fig. S3 for histograms of sample
distributions). It should be noted that because of the scaling of the
DCortisol variable, these distributions additionally reﬂect very
small effects if any. To illustrate this, we can use the mean DCortisol
value from the Control condition (0.04) and the Stress condition
(0.20) to reconstruct the effect of cortisol on behavior
(DCortisol ¼ 0.04 vs. DCortisol ¼ 0.20: r ¼ 0.92 vs. 0.91; l ¼ 2.18
vs. 2.22; m ¼ 25.9 vs. 26.3).
As with Model 1, we additionally ran Model 2 on men only to
check for gender speciﬁcity, generally replicating the ﬁndings from
Model 2 estimated on all participants. Baseline parameter esti-
mates were similar (mean recovered r ¼ 0.89, 95%CI ¼ [0.82 0.96];
mean recovered l ¼ 2.47, 95% CI ¼ [1.82 3.28]; and mean recovered
m ¼ 23.0, 95% CI ¼ [16.6 30.6]). Like with Model 1's estimates from
men only, we replicated the null effect of Day on risk attitudes (95%
CI for DrDM ¼ [-0.02 0.07]) and the positive effect on consistency
(95% CI for DmDM ¼ [0.31 0.70]), but did not replicate the effect of
Day on loss aversion (95% CI for DlDM ¼ [-0.08 0.29]; the CI had to
be relaxed to 71.5% to exclude zero), while DCortisol was found to
have no consistent effect on any of the value parameters (95% CI for
DrCM ¼ [-0.15 0.14]; 95% CI for DlCM ¼ [-0.60 0.56]; 95% CI for
DmCM ¼ [-0.25 1.12]). See Fig. S3 for histograms of Model 2's
parameter samples.
We ran additional models to test the sensitivity of these ﬁndings
to the use of ﬁxed instead of random effects, the use of more
constrained models, and non-hierarchical maximum likelihood
models. Findings of these ancillary models were identical to those
above (see Supplementary Materials).
As with Model 1, the change in endowment at the end of Day 1
was signiﬁcantly correlated with Model 2's DlDi (r(117) ¼ 0.31,
p ¼ 0.0007) but not with DrDi (r(117) ¼ 0.06, p ¼ 0.53) or DmDi
(r(117) ¼ 0.07, p ¼ 0.47), ﬁndings that replicated with non-
parametric Spearman's correlations.
3.2.3. Basal cortisol and behavior
As some studies have found that baseline cortisol values may be
related to risky decision-making (Chumbley et al., 2014), we tested
whether basal cortisol values (i.e. the very ﬁrst cortisol samples,
taken prior to any CPT intervention) correlated with any of the
individual parameter estimates from the hierarchical Bayesian
analysis (see Section 3.2.2) for r, l, and/or m. Because estimates of
behavior were calculated after the CPT, this analysis was limited to
the 60 participants whowere in the Control condition on Day 1 andwhose behavior is most clearly at “baseline”. We used the param-
eter estimates calculated from Model 2, but ﬁndings were virtually
identical using those from Model 1. Correlating the basal cortisol
values on Day 1 with mean individual-level parameter samples on
that day found no relationships with risk attitudes (Pearson's
r(58) ¼ 0.06, p ¼ 0.65) nor loss aversion (Pearson's r(58) ¼ 0.05,
p ¼ 0.68), and although there was a correlation with consistency
(Pearson's r(58) ¼ 0.35, p ¼ 0.006), visual inspection suggested it
was driven by outliers (Spearman's rho ¼ 0.16, p ¼ 0.23).
4. Discussion
Fully 78% of adults in the United States report experiencing
stress at some point in the past month (APA, 2016), making it
critical to understand whether and how intense and pervasive af-
fective states like stress interact with decision-making. Here, we
pursued this question using a large within-subjects design, an
econometric model of valuation and decision-making that disso-
ciates three underlying decision processes in risky decision-
making, hierarchical Bayesian analysis that maximally combines
data while allowing for heterogeneity in behavior, and objectively
quantiﬁed endogenous acute stress responses. In doing so, we ﬁnd
no evidence for an effect of acute stress on risk attitudes, loss
aversion, or consistency over choices.
We do ﬁnd effects of repeated participation in the study, in that
participants are more loss averse and more consistent on the sec-
ond day relative to the ﬁrst. A previous study from our lab also used
a two-day design with the same task and although we observed
increases in loss aversion on the second day, the increases were
unrelated to Day 1 payment, and there were no changes in con-
sistency (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2015b). Thus, while we encourage
caution, especially in interpreting the effect of repetition on con-
sistency, it does appear that participants weigh losses more heavily
on their second day. One explanation could be that participants
treated the money as “house money” (e.g. not their own) on the
ﬁrst day, despite our detailed instructions. When participants were
paid real money at the end of the ﬁrst day, they might have then
returned on the second day, somehow more invested in the task,
leading to greater loss aversion and consistency. However, while
payment on Day 1 was correlated with the change in loss aversion,
it did not correlate with changes in consistency. Additionally, this
mechanism might also predict greater risk aversion for gains (risk
seeking for losses), which we did not observe. As our study was not
designed to test this hypothesis, we must rely upon future work for
more deﬁnitive tests.
Though we ﬁnd no effect of acute stress on risk attitudes (or loss
aversion or consistency), what might explain previous ﬁndings to
the contrary? First, it's possible that acute stress alters a decision-
making process that we did not measure or manipulate in our
study (e.g. probability weighting, temporal discounting, learning
rates, ambiguity attitudes), but which was confounded with risky
choices in other studies. As the vast majority of previous studies
used the simple probability of gambling to assess risk attitudes (see
Table S1), such conﬂation is very possible. For example, the Iowa
Gambling Task and the Game of Dice Task are particularly popular
paradigms, accounting for no fewer than seven of the previous
studies on risky decision-making and stress, but their variable-
probability, mixed gain & loss designs conﬂate many possible
decision-making processes. Our task also had real monetary con-
sequences and showed participants their outcomes on a trial-by-
trial basis e hypothetical choices (or choices without feedback)
may be differentially affected. Finally, it is of course possible that an
overarching explanation for previously inconsistent ﬁndings may
be relatively weak statistical power, either within the task (e.g. few
trials) or at the study level (e.g. few participants; a brief review of
P. Sokol-Hessner et al. / Neurobiology of Stress 5 (2016) 19e25 25the literature identiﬁes a preponderance of low-power between-
subjects designs, and an average of ~60 participants/study; see
Table S1).
More generally, this study examined decisions made over rela-
tively simple explicitly described risky monetary options. To the
extent to which decisions in other situations may involve other
kinds of options, it is possible that stress may affect decision-
making e but our ﬁndings suggest that such an effect would not
be due to changes in risk attitudes, loss aversion, or choice
consistency.
Additionally, while this study focused on acute stress, there is
evidence that chronic, longer-term stress may alter decisions under
risk. One study found that cortisol administration for eight
consecutive days increased risk aversion (decreased gambling;
Kandasamy et al., 2014), while another used hair samples to esti-
mate approximate cortisol exposure over the previous twomonths,
ﬁnding that chronic levels of cortisol were unrelated to risk atti-
tudes but instead were negatively correlated with loss aversion
(Chumbley et al., 2014).
The differences between endogenous and exogenous cortisol,
acute and chronic stress levels, physiological and social stressors,
cortisol and other biomarkers of stress, and other factors governing
when, how, and in what context stress responses occur may ulti-
mately prove critical to our understanding of the interactions be-
tween stress and decision-making. Nevertheless, the ﬁndings from
our robust design and analysis combining for the ﬁrst time quan-
titative estimation of risky decision-making and objective manip-
ulations of acute stress, in the context of inconsistent previous
ﬁndings, suggest that acute stress does not affect risk attitudes, loss
aversion, or consistency in risky monetary decision-making.
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